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POLICE PROBLEMS IN INDUSTRIAL PROTECTION
Kenneth E. Kline
Even before December 7, 1941 if'became evident that an expan-
sion of industrial protection was to be very necessary, throughout
the entire country.
Based on requests from Indiana industries and a knowledge of
the requirements of the situation, the Public Safety Institute of
Purdue University organized an Industrial Protection Division in
September 1941 for the purpose of assisting Indiana industry in the
development of effective industrial protection units.
Since the organization of this Division a great deal of research
and training has been completed. Information materials have been
secured from over three hundred sources in the United States, Can-
ada and Great Britain. The greater part of this material came from
industrial plants, police departments, fire departments, safety or-
ganizations and insurance companies. Based on this information
and the experience of the writer in industry and the United States-
Army, materials relating to the police, fire and safety phases of pro-
tection have been prepared. This material covers all phases of train-
ing, administration, tactics and supply.
The Public Safety Institute has also established a reference
library on the subject of industrial protection, for the use of all
Indiana industries.
Schools and regional meetings for the purpose of training in-
structors and supervisors in the technique of training industrial
plant protection units are conducted regularly.
The entire program is designed to present the basic materials
necessary for the formation of new protection units and for the
effective functioning of those units already established. The mate-
rial and information presented is supplementary to that of the vari-
ous governmental agencies concerned with this field.
Based on our experience in this work the following police prob-
lems in industrial protection are presented. There are many more
which, for obvious reasons, cannot be discussed in an article of this
nature.
Employment Checking
The job of industrial protection begins in the personnel depart-
ment.
It is the first concern of any plant to determine the accurate
historical background of every person employed therein. If the com-
plete personnel background of each employee is known the plant is
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in a position to eliminate those persons who have some characteris-
tics in their history which might be dangerous to production.
In order to stop production the saboteur must either introduce
himself into the plant as an employee, as an unauthorized person,
or carry out his work through a regular employee. Proper personnel
checks can eliminate a large portion of this possibility.
To determine the proper history of each employee the plant
should obtain written references from responsible persons who have
known the employee for a period of five years, who are not relatives
and who are not former employers. The complete work record should
be checked, this to account for every day the person has worked
since he took his first job. His possible police record should be devel-
oped, personal investigation of his habits, associates and other in-
formation about his home life should be secured along with a retail
credit bureau report to determine his financial resources and reli-
ability.
In addition to the above, birth certificates or .other information
(acceptable to other Government agencies) should be established.
Employees should be finger printed and their prints sent through
proper channels to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for neces-
sary action.
All other information necessary to develop the complete and ac-
curate history should be secured.
To illustrate the necessity for some of these checks let us assume
that in checking the police record of an employee it is determined
that he is a drunkard. Because he is a drunkard it may not follow
that he should be discharged, but it certainly would follow that he
not be placed in a vital spot in the plant where he has access to con-
fidential or secret information because we know he may talk at the
wrong time.
To illustrate another case let us assume that the retail credit
bureau report indicates that the employee has a poor financial struc-
ture. This would tell us that he may become a very definite avenue
of approach into the plaht for some agent bent on the stoppage of
production. Hip-pocket loan artists have been known to function
in the vicinity of industrial plants and naturally they single out
such industrial employees as are financially embarrassed. When
such an employee becomes obligated he makes himself liable and
provides a possible means of damage to the plant through some
"squeeze act."
And again a personal investigation may show that an employee
gambles rather heavily. This information would bar him from em-
ployment in any department where he might be tempted by possible
embezzlement, or other acts where he has opportunity to convert
industrial funds to his own use.
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Finally-by determining this background we are able to place
each employee in a position where he is least likely to damage the
plant and we are able to compensate for any irregular conditions
in his complete structure. After the determination of this back-
ground for each employee is completed and we know all of our em-
ployees, the other primary job for complete protection is the neces-
sary mechanical process of keeping unauthorized persons and mate-
rials out of the plant.
Identification System
The first phase of the mechanical process is the establishment of
a system to identify each and every person entering and leaving the
plant. This is usually accomplished by the use of credentials such as,
photo badges and identification cards. We all know that almost any
type of such card can be counterfeited, therefore, we must be care-
ful in designing such credentials.
A system of background colors or special passes should be de-
vised for all vital, vulnerable, secret and special defense areas.
In checking personnel at the gates every employee should be
identified by the proper credentials. This is applicable to each person
regardless of his position.
A great many devices can be used to facilitate this identification
system as the use of single lane runways, turnstiles, and other types
of block gates.
No system of passes or identifying credentials is effective unless
the employees of the patrol division are taught to use them properly
for identification. It has been reported that an agent of a Govern-
ment bureau gained admittance to a plant even though he had in-
serted the picture of a monkey in the place of his photograph in his
photo badge !
Employees
In order to be successful every protection department must have
a very close working agreement with all other employees in the plant.
Every employee in the plant should be a protection unit member
in some capacity. If such is the case every unusual act which might
or might not be sabotage, poor conditions of housekeeping, unsafe
working conditions, safety hazards, fire hazards or any other condi-
tion which might damage production will be observed by some em-
ployee and reported to the protection department for proper action.
A reserve protection unit of regular employees should be made
to fulfill the requirements of the emergency defense organization,
that is, to function as air-raid wardens, fire watchers, etc.
In order to be successful any protection unit must have the good
will and confidence of each employee in the plant. In other words,
every employee must be made to feel that it is his responsibility to
protect life and property within the plant as well as to carry on his
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normal function of. production. This is a very definite public rela-
tions job.
Visitors
Every visitor going into a plant should be sent to a reception
desk. At this point he should be required to identify himself to the
satisfaction of the plant and government officials. Before being per-
mitted to enter the plant he should be required to sign a release pro-
tecting the plant management and the United States Government.
During the present emergency and due to the enormous produc-
tion required, the writer believes it is not good policy to permit any
visitors in the plant unless such visits are absolutely necessary.
(Government regulations usually cover.)
Each visitor should be escorted by a runner to and from his point
of contact. No visitor should ever be allowed in the plant at any time
without such escort unless he has authority to be unescorted. Special
care should be taken to ascertain that such authority is genuine.
Automobiles, Trucks, Trains, Boats
In checking any vehicle entering the plant there are three pri-
mary requirements to be met. The first being to identify all pas-
sengers; second, to check the authorization of the vehicle entering
the plant and third-to determine that there are no unauthorized
materials in the vehicle.
This requires a very careful search. Where possible it is advis-
able to have a classification yard or some enclosure into which the
vehicle can be introduced while being searched.
One problem which presents itself in this particular phase is
the necessity for the entrance and exit of ambulances, fire equip-
ment or other emergency vehicles. Regulations for them must be
consistent with the requirements of protection and the necessity
of the emergency.
All packages, materials equipment and other items belonging to
the company or to the employees should be checked at the gates upon
entrance or exit of employees to determine if they contain any un-
authorized materials.
A similar inspection must be made for all visitors or any other
persons entering or leaving the plant.
Fences
Anpther step in our mechanical process is to make the approach
to the plant as difficult as possible. One requirement is the establish-
ment of fences or barriers around the entire plant property. Ordi-
narily these fences or barriers do not keep people out of the plant
but they serve to deter or delay unauthorized entry. Therefore it
becomes necessary that the entire fence line be under constant ob-
servation, either mechanical or visual or a combination of both.
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Observation towers may be erected around the outside enclosure
at a height or distance from the fence which will provide the best
interlocking observation. The location of these towers will depend
upon the physical nature of the plant and surrounding territory.
High points of building, roofs or other similar locations may be used
as observation towers. These towers should be equipped with search-
lights to allow any unusual objects or movements to be picked up at
night. They should also be equipped with the necessary arms for
proper protection and a means of communication to keep the towers
in constant contact with headquarters. Care should be taken in de-
signing the flood lighting scheme for the plant to allow maximum
observation at all times.
Sound detection devices may also be used along the fence lines
to indicate any unusual contacts with the fence.
Patrol roads or paths should be established along this line. These
may be used by patrolmen on foot, in motor vehicles, or both. These
road or path systems should be designed to permit the patrols to
operate in dark areas and special care should be taken that they are
never silhouetted against any lights.
Patrols should also be established outside the fence lines to de-
termine any unusual activity in these areas.
Patrols-Interior
Patrols are essential in any plant for two reasons: a. The estab-
lishment of definite areas of coverage. b. Normal purposes of ob-
servation.
In the development of these patrols the technical experts in the
plant should be consulted in order that the vital, vulnerable and
other special areas can be carefully covered. In the establishment
of these rounds the time element must be analyzed in order to allow
the patrols ample opportunity for observation. The time for start-
ing these patrols on their routes must be changed periodically in
order to prevent the anticipated arrival at any given point.
Points of communication contact must be established through-
out the patrol rounds in order to allow the patrol to maintain con-
stant communication with headquarters. The general objective
of these patrols is to discover police hazards, fire hazards, safety
hazards, and any unusual activity at any time.
Flying Squadron
A group of specially trained men may be used as a flying
squadron. Those selected for this purpose are to be trained in
every aspect of plant protection. They work on an unanticipated
schedule over the entire plant. The primary purpose of such a
group is to permit the protection supervisor to make special spot
checks in certain areas as desired. This group, of course, must
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work in the open and the employes must never be allowed to feel
that they are a secret or undercover group.
Emergencies
Detailed plans for any emergency should be established and
tested prior to the possibility of such an emergency. Every
protection unit member should be assigned his particular duties
for any emergency, be trained and then rehearsed in these duties,
so that when the emergency occurs the operation of the protection
unit will be automatic.
Plans for an emergency should be coordinated with the
following agencies :-plant police department, plant fire depart-
ment, plant medical service, plant safety department, plant
maintenance department, plant wardens division, adjacent police
departments, adjacent fire departments, adjacent medical services
and all other organizations that may be useful in any type of
emergency.
The emergency organization should be designed to care for
fires, explosions, riots, major accidents, air-raids, black-outs, para-
chute or ground attacks, or any others which might disrupt pro-
duction.
The passive protective measures necessary to conform with
the instructions published by the War Department, Navy Depart-
ment, the Office of Civilian Defense and other recognized govern-
ment agencies should be established.
Municipal Police
A very close working agreement between the plant protection
group and the adjacent police departments must be established.
This is especially necessary in the event the plant must call on
adjacent police departments for assistance in the case of an
emergency. It is also true where it is necessary to coordinate the
traffic efforts with those of the adjacent police units.
Proper coordination of the efforts of the plant police and the
adjacent police will result in much better public relations as far as
employes are concerned and should facilitate their movement
to and from the plant.
The municipal police should assist the plant police in the
training of the latter in those subjects common to both departments.
This will require very careful preparation on the part of both de-
partments in order that it may be accomplished.
Training Program
Because of many conditions confronting protection units today
a constant training program should be effected. This program
should be designed to include the normal peace-time functions of
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protection work as well as the emergency requirements. A careful
and comprehensive program is necessary because the great majority
of men and women employed in protection units- have had. no
previous training in this field. Therefore, they must have a basic
or recruit training course of instruction before they can be taught
the advanced features of protection.
It is believed that the training course should run for a period
of at least six months to a year, of from two to four hours a week.
It is not believed that a protection member can be trained to per-
form all of its functions properly in a less period of time.
The minimum training course should include the following sub-
jects: Protection organizations, patrol problems, emergencies,
traffic control, fire prevention, fire inspections, fire practices;
safety inspections, plant geography, ethics and courtesy, public
relations, police tactics, self-defense, first-aid, sabotage, leadership,
identification, bombs and explosives, reports and report writing,
discipline, state and federal laws, patrol rules and regulations,
safety rules and regulations and small arms firing. These sub-
jects may be broken down into many other allied ones.
In selecting training instructors care should be taken to de-
termine that such persons not only have the necessary knowledge
relative to protection but also the ability to teach others. This
question of training has too often been charged to an individual
who does not have the necessary knowledge of the subject or the
ability to impart it to others.
It must be understood that the protection unit can be effective
only where men are properly trained and this course of training
must be abreast of the present day requirements of protection.
The foregoing observations are applicable to any type of plant.
They are necessary in every plant regardless of its size. For
instance, as soon as we purchase one fire extinguisher we have a
fire department, or as soon as we employ one guard or patrolman
we have a police department. It would be entirely possible to
stop the production of some of our large war machines simply
by the destruction of a very small plant which may be supplying
some small part or parts for the assembly of the larger unit.
CORRECTION
On page 324 in our last number is a note entitled: "Blood Tests
in Affliation Proceedings." The material is from Section 120 (not
12 as stated in our note), Part XIV of Act 17, 1939, New. South
Wales. The title of the Act is: "Child Welfare Act." We are in-
debted to Mr. George Wiener of Brooklyn, N. Y. both for the
original note and for this correction. (Ed.)
